Inducements, which transfer money from one level of government to another conditional on the recipient performing particular actions, imply somewhat more goodwill between the inducer and the inducee. Rather than assuming that the targets of the policy are recalcitrant, inducements assume common interests coupled with lack of resources. According to McDonnell and Elmore, policy makers who design an inducement are assuming that "one would not expect certain valued things to be produced, or to be produced with the frequency or consistency prescribed by the policy," that "preferences and priorities [of targets] support the production of these things," and that "individuals and agencies vary in their ability to produce things of value, and that the transfer of money is one way to elicit performance." Implementation of inducements poses a "central problem" for officials: "how much variation policymakers are willing to tolerate in production of things of value, and how narrowly they are willing to prescribe how money is to be used and what is to be produced" (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987, p. 
142).
This problem has been particularly acute in school integration, and in other policies intended to make public schools perform better or more equitably (i.e., McLaughlin, 1990; Kirst, 2004; Welner & Oakes, 2005; Manna, 2006; Fuhrman, Goertz, and Weinbaum, 2007; Wells, 2009 ). Policy analysts have generally assumed that some degree of coercion is necessary for equity to result (Hochschild 1984; Vergon 1990 ). Kevin Welner and Jeannie Oakes examine school de-tracking policies in three communities, and argue that federal court orders, while not sufficient to bring about change, were essential in supporting the communities' "bottom up" mobilization in the development of equity policy (Welner & Oakes, 2005) . While Welner's and Oakes's example is federal mandates, as opposed to TASAP's competitive grant structure, we find it a transferrable concept to thinking about the role of the federal government in assisting 6 local efforts to promote educational equity. Mandates may actually affect local policy choices from below rather than above, if they inspire or complement politics on the ground. This sort of local pressure for equity is significant because otherwise, as Hochschild (2005, p. 328 ) has pointed out, school boards "often work to maintain if not increase political and educational inequality across groups in the larger arena" because of their responsiveness to "well-off, disproportionately white, parents" (Hochschild, 2005, p. 329) .
Since the 1990s, however, federal courts have backed away from compelling racial integration. In fact, with the Parents Involved in Community Schools decision (discussed below), the federal government appears to be compelling districts to move in the other direction, by narrowing the circumstances in which individual children's race may affect their assignment to a particular school. At the same time, some localities have built political support for integration or its near relative, racial "diversity" (Holley-Walker 2010; McDermott, DeBray, & Frankenberg in press) . In this context, it may not be naïve to expect that federal inducements could lead to new racial equity policies, or support existing ones. In the context of standards-based reform and NCLB, Paul Manna and Jennifer Wallner (2011) observe that "producing valued outcomes in education and other social policy areas increasingly depends on the ability of federal policy to help mobilize networks of actors" (2011, p. 168) . Transferring this concept to our present inquiry, targeted federal incentives like TASAP, which is aimed at enhancing opportunity in selected localities via mobilization of multiple actors, would presumably be a better policy tool than a large-scale set of mandates across multiple levels of government (such as NCLB parental choice).
Greater federal incentives for equity have also been advocated recently by both Chinh Le (2011) and Gary Orfield (2011) ; the latter has called for reviving technical assistance for school 7 desegregation along the lines of the former ESAA. Other scholars have called for targeted federal incentives for equity-based policies, including socioeconomic diversity (Kahlenberg, 2012) , more targeted provisions for racial balance in magnet schools (Frankenberg & Le, 2008) , and incentives for inter-district choice (Holme & Wells, 2008) and targeted suburban school transfer/housing relocation programs (DeBray & Frankenberg, 2011) .
Methods
Our research methods were primarily qualitative. We conducted interviews with people who were involved in federal-level decisions about TASAP, in order to identify its designers' intended goals about supporting district-level change. The district-level data, which investigates the specific questions of the districts' adoption of policies and implementation, was collected in nine of the eleven awardee districts 1 between summer of 2011 and spring of 2012. In these nine districts, we conducted interviews with school board members, administrators, staff identified on TASAP applications, consultants hired through TASAP, and activists on all sides of public debate about diversity in education. We conducted a limited form of "snowball" sampling by asking each interviewee to identify other people we should talk with. Among other topics, interviews probed the reasons the district applied for TASAP funds, the local educational and/or political needs served by the grant-funded efforts, the kinds of coalitions that were emerging in the districts, and the various reasons why constituents supported or opposed the grant activities.
We engaged in ongoing collaborative analysis of interview data and documents (including all eleven successful TASAP applications, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act), as well as through case-specific analyses. Education Act (ESEA), on the condition that the districts were no longer segregated (Rosenberg, 1991; Orfield, 1969) . Technically, this use of federal money was an inducement, not a mandate (since districts were not required to accept ESEA funds). However, because school districts needed the funding, in practice it worked more like a mandate by pushing districts to desegregate when, if past patterns had held, they would not have. According to Reardon et al., "in 1964, 99% of black students in the South attended all-black schools, whereas by 1971, only about 20% attended such schools, and schools in the South were more integrated than elsewhere in the country" (2011, p. 1). Although districts that had been de jure segregated needed to be certified as integrated in order to receive Title I funds, the federal government did not stringently enforce the integration requirement outside the South. For example, when an official at the U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare threatened to withhold Chicago's Title I funds because the district was using portable classrooms to keep black students in overcrowded, predominantly black schools while predominantly white schools had space available, the official lost his job and Chicago retained both the portable classrooms and the Title I funds (Bailey & Mosher, 1968) . Beginning in the 1990s, federal courts became more lenient in their interpretations of what it meant for a formerly de jure segregated district to be integrated, and also began rejecting racial-balance policies as unconstitutional for the same reason that de jure segregation had been. These shifts culminated in the Parents Involved in Community Schools (PICS) decision, which will be discussed in more detail below. During this period, requirements for standards and accountability replaced racial integration as the most visible ESEA-related 9 mandates (Cohen & Moffitt, 2009 ). Reardon et al. (2011) have documented that with the end of court-ordered desegregation in southern school systems, millions more students are attending racially isolated schools.
The federal government also had desegregation programs that fit McDonnell and Elmore's "incentive" category. The Emergency School Assistance Act (ESAA) lasted from 1972 to 1981 and "funded training, intervention programs, new curricula development, magnet schools, and large-scale research on ways to improve race relations" (Orfield, 2007, p. 3) . ESAA
conditions required recipients to demonstrate that they were not engaged in discriminatory practices within schools (Vergon, 1990) . Orfield notes that "school districts eagerly applied for these funds" and indeed, "districts were often willing to do additional desegregation of students and teachers, not required by their own [court-ordered] (Monroe, 2008) , which was viewed by many in the civil rights community as stifling the development of constitutional practices in local school districts (see Le, 2011, p. 80 ).
The Technical Assistance for Student Assignment Plans Grants
Despite PICS, many school districts have continued with policies that strive to assign students to schools in ways that will facilitate "diversity" in enrollments. Some of these districts are still operating under desegregation agreements, and thus not directly affected by PICS, but others either never were under order or are continuing diversity policies after being declared unitary (McDermott, DeBray, & Frankenberg, in press; Holley-Walker, 2010 Jeff Simering said, "we did our thing, you know, up on the Hill, and discussed this with both the authorizers and the appropriators, and I think they seemed to be in fairly easy agreement that providing some help for some folks immediately after the decision seemed an appropriate thing to do so that's how it came about" (J. Simering and M. Naik, personal communication, 12/2/11).
Formally, TASAP was a $2.5 million addition to the Equity Assistance Centers' budget, earmarked for technical assistance grants to districts for revising their student assignment plans.
Establishing a separate grant program, rather than adding to the mission of the existing Equity Assistance Centers, was a deliberate decision. Reflecting on this decision, Simering stated:
You could've potentially directed the technical assistance centers to take on this thing, but we didn't want to constrain our districts [to] doing things that a technical assistance center decided were appropriate….we wanted to at least let our districts deal creatively with the issue and the particular politics they had to deal with (J. Simering, personal communication, 12/2/11). TASAP and the local grantees were spending their funds, it is important to bear in mind that the impetus for TASAP came from outside USED. In fact, the first notice the office that would implement TASAP had of the program came from its budget officer, "saying there is language in the appropriation for the equity centers this year that talks about doing technical assistance for districts who want to develop a student assignment plan" (anonymous federal official, personal communication, 2/10/12). Some evidence suggested that the Obama-era USED would take a quite different stance on race and diversity than its predecessor had. than with a higher-profile event. From 2009 on, USED seems not to have been trying to make a dramatic change in its stance on diversity and student assignment policies. In fact, consistent with USED's normal operating principles, it seems to have been trying to avoid drama entirely.
Implementing TASAP at the Federal Level
A theory of change can be identified in the appropriations language that created TASAP.
In essence, the idea of the program was for the federal government to provide funds for a wide range of local activities, without specifying too much in advance what school districts ought to do. As described above, this theory came largely from outside the U.S. Department of Education. The department itself, as it often does, avoided narrowing districts' options or
offering interpretations of what the language meant.
TASAP's Theory of Change
If having a federal theory of change means that staff in either Congress or USED sat down and thought through what they wanted to do with TASAP, then we have to conclude that the federal government did not have a theory of change. However, a theory of change is implicit in the appropriations language; in fact, it is probably not too large a stretch to say that the Council of Great City Schools called on the federal budget to implement its own theory of change. The Council wanted to ensure that school districts would be able to continue work on diversity in some way. As Jeff Simering put it, "We didn't really want to constrain people [in 14 districts] because we didn't know what direction they might want to go in, but we wanted them to go in at least some direction" (J. Simering and M. Naik, personal communication, 12/2/11).
Simering's explanation sounds very much like McDonnell and Elmore's account of the assumptions behind use of incentives (as opposed to mandates) in education policy, cited above.
Policy makers turn to incentives when they are willing to tolerate a wide variety of possible responses, rather than insisting on one specific outcome. In this instance, it was also true that the kinds of expertise districts needed were available, if they were able to pay for it.
In contrast with earlier uses of federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act funding as leverage for desegregation in resistant communities (Orfield, 1969; Cascio, Gordon, Lewis, & Reber, 2008) , TASAP funds are not intended to induce changes in local leaders' preferences, but to help them pursue a preference they have already expressed, within a changed legal environment. In fact, TASAP is a result of a desire for assistance expressed by local leaders, via the Council.
The Federal Register notice of TASAP lists the program's Absolute Priority as follows:
Applications from LEAs seeking to obtain technical assistance in preparing, adopting, or modifying, and implementing student assignment plans that use strategies to avoid racial isolation and resegregation in their schools, and to facilitate student diversity, that are permissible within the parameters of current law. LEAs must use the grant funds to seek assistance and expertise from student assignment specialists, demographers, community relations specialists, facility and other planners, curriculum specialists and others in comparable school districts with relevant and successful experience, as well as specialists and consultants from academia, non-profit organizations, civil right organizations, and the private sector.
The Federal Register also states that proposed project budgets must not exceed $250,000, to be spent over a period of up to 24 months (Federal Register, v. 74, no. 139, p. 36175) .
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A few elements of a theory of action can be identified in this language. It refers to the inviting school districts to seek USED help in pushing the bounds of PICS, and to craft studentassignment plans that Justice Kennedy and the four liberals might vote to uphold. These plans might emerge looking like those of "school districts with relevant and successful experience,"
which it seems logical to imagine as districts whose student-assignment plans were achieving diversity and avoiding resegregation in ways likely to survive federal court scrutiny (rather than as districts safe from federal scrutiny because they did not have those goals). However, despite these lofty goals, the technical assistance may only last for two years, and must cost less than $250,000. The program also has a "Competitive Preference Priority" for school districts with board-approved "voluntary student assignment plans" in place, suggesting that they sought to direct funds to districts that already had shown local support for diversity plans. It appears, however, that in the absence of explicit, clear guidance during the TASAP application stage and most of the duration of TASAP grants, confusion remained even among the eleven districts that were funded. Although the RFP cited the goal of avoiding racial isolation and resegregation, it did not specify whether the plans supported by the technical assistance could use race or whether they were prohibited from doing so, and according to an anonymous federal official, they received numerous inquiries from districts that were trying to understand what types of plans to propose that might receive funding. Yet, as the official said, "it wasn't like we could say, 'here is the money, here's what the Department thinks, take it or leave it, go for it.'
It was in my mind really a great opportunity but if you couldn't grasp that opportunity as a district, then we weren't providing any help. Just the money." From the perspective of a successful district (e.g., a district that received a TASAP grant), a district participant reflected some frustration with the federal ambiguity, saying that if there were future grants, she "would hope that more guidance would come with it, more facilitation would come with it, rather than just giving us the money to find the facilitator, that there would be more opportunity for districts The RFP included a very tight turnaround time for districts to submit grants (they were due August 21). This made it likelier that applications would come primarily from districts that were either already working on student assignment issues or had staff members responsible for identifying federal grants for which the districts might apply (Anonymous Reviewer, personal communication, 9/29/11). The inclusion of need for the grant as the largest source of points (25 out of 100) probably limited the chances of rural and suburban districts to be funded. In particular, the RFP describes how this need will be evaluated as including "consideration of the complexity of the student assignment plan -the extent to which the applicant's student assignment plan involves particular challenges because of either the size of the student body that is part of the plan, the diversity of the student population that is part of the plan, or the applicant's current pattern for assigning students to schools" (Federal Register, v. 74, no. 139, p. 36177) . As a result many of those who were grant recipients were urban districts facing the challenge of declining enrollments and funding. According to a federal official who preferred anonymity, USED did some outreach through the desegregation assistance centers, but did not contact particular districts, in order to avoid the appearance that those districts had an inside track to win the funding.
The short turnaround time meant that the districts did not have time to consult with community organizations about how best to set up their local projects. In the field, this seems to have contributed to the TASAP grants' frequently being low-profile undertakings. Finally, since all of the funds left USED at the same time, the department did not have financial leverage over the districts once their projects began. The only financial report required is not due until the end of the project, and nearly all of the districts have received no-cost extensions; 2 thus, comprehensive information about how much the districts spent on what is not available is not available at this point. Even if there had been multiple stages to the federal funds, it seems unlikely that USED would have attempted to use them as leverage. As the anonymous federal official with whom we spoke reiterated, "these people are all super committed to making this stuff work and we are glad we can get them the money. But we don't try to intervene other than that" (personal communication, 2/10/12).
For the sole grant reviewer we have interviewed thus far, the language in the RFP meant there was some ambiguity about what projects to fund. The selection criteria in the RFP are less specific than the language that describes the grant program. The "Need" criterion mentions that the diversity of the population included in the plan will be considered, but the criteria do not mention racial isolation or, indeed, race (Federal Register, v. 74, no. 139, He said:
You do have this Federal Register that points in one direction, but does not rule out funding other things. If you are a reviewer, you can take a position that we want to fund diversity plans, or you can take the position that you would fund any number of plans (Anonymous Reviewer, personal communication, 9/29/11).
When we asked this individual about his perceptions of the theory of change driving TASAP, he described what he viewed as the weaknesses of the grant as an effective federal policy lever:
I feel like that money is so small that it's not really leveraging anything. If you are really thinking about use of that money would have been better used to fund yourself [the interviewer] to be hired at the U.S. Department of Education to serve as the national coordinator and technical assistant director for student assignment. That way there is somewhere there to work through and answer questions about the grants. And that way you are not leveraging but you are providing assistance to the extent where needed as opposed to acting like you are doing something. The money they got was not going to affect policy decisions (Anonymous Reviewer, personal communication, 9/29/11).
Compared with the likely results of a mandate, this may not seem like a great deal of impact.
However, it is consistent with McDonnell and Elmore's analysis of the implicit theory of action 20 behind incentives: that the targets of the policy are inclined to do what the policy maker wants them to do, if they get resources in exchange for doing it.
To summarize, the TASAP enactment process was driven by the civil rights and urban education communities' urgent sense that a rapidly put-together, small-scale program to which there might be a wide variation of local response was better than no response and no alternatives for districts post-PICS. Although there was no a priori worked-out theory of change from the federal level, the appropriations language did contain explicit principles. The first was that districts' response should draw on outside consultants, i.e., from experts across a range of sectors including private, non-profit and academic. The second was that that community and civil rights groups' support would be important at the local level. Third, local context mattered: there would be a range of appropriate uses for the funds, depending on local "particular needs and complexity of plans." Undergirding all of these was the explicit statement that it was all to be done in service of the goal of preventing racially isolated schools.
As we will see, this legislative enactment process (which we view as a rather savvy maneuver by a coalition in the midst of a very politically challenging time for their causes), and the final language, enabled a wide latitude in the subsequent implementation process, at both federal and local levels.
What Happened in the TASAP Districts
We turn next to the questions of what kinds of policies were adopted or advocated for by the ten districts during the period we studied, and what kinds of Technical Assistance we found that the grants actually supported. (See Appendix B for a summary table of types of technical assistance and policy aims in the original applications.)
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Types of Technical Assistance
Because of the no-cost extensions of most TASAP grants, we cannot yet know for sure exactly how districts spent all the money. Given the emphasis on compliance with PICS and other federal court decisions, and the plans outlined in TASAP applications, we were surprised that attorneys were relatively infrequent providers of technical assistance in TASAP districts.
Based on our interviews to date, the most popular kind of technical assistance has been various kinds of data analysis, particularly geospatial analysis that links demographic and educational data to neighborhoods. Jefferson County, Kentucky, which was already in the midst of redesigning its student-assignment policy to comply with Meredith when it received the TASAP grant, used some of its TASAP funds to develop a system for tracking and reporting on student requests to transfer among schools. Both Portland, Oregon and Hillsborough County, Florida hired SEER Analytics, a firm in Tampa, to develop and analyze a variety of student-assignment scenarios using diversity indices that did not include race. Rockford, Illinois, San Francisco, and Champaign, Illinois also contracted for development of diversity indices.
Districts have also used TASAP funds to pay for help with community engagement on student assignment policy, such as facilitators and publicity. Champaign officials spent part of the grant on to focus on improving publicity about the choice plan, create a new website to include online application submission, and to dispel myths about the choice plan. The marketing is clearly aimed at white/affluent parents.
St. Paul, Minnesota, decided to use a large amount of its TASAP funds to broaden the strategic planning for which it was already contracting with TeamWorks International, a
Minnesota consultancy that "work[s] with mission-focused organizations to build their capacity for long-term success" (http://teamworksintl.net/twi/?page_id=18). TeamWorks analyzed 22 student demographics and achievement data across the city and concluded that students enrolled in magnet schools were actually performing slightly worse academically than students in nonmagnet schools. One Board of Education member noted that the problem was more acute for students of color: "white kids in the city can do well regardless of income, regardless of where they go to school but kids of color were really not being served by the magnets and they were spending a lot of time on buses" (J. O'Connell, personal communication, 12/6/11). TeamWorks also pointed out to the district that if it could attract more of the city's students back into the public schools from charter and private schools, it would not need to close as many schools as it was assuming it would need to. Schools, to hold community meetings, parent engagement sessions, and conduct direct student recruitment. In addition to coordinating marketing efforts, he helped the Parish make some necessary changes to the admission procedures for the magnet programs. Upon his arrival, both magnet programs were designed to admit students of one race. He undertook the necessary steps to secure changes in admissions policies so that students of both races could be admitted to both programs (R. Domingue, personal communication, 10/12/11).
Types of Change in Student Assignment Policies
The TASAP grantee districts did not generally try to push the limits of PICS or develop race-conscious policies that were consistent with Justice Kennedy's concurrence. Jefferson
County came the closest, but it was already engaged in this work before receiving the TASAP grant. It also had to deal with a state court challenge to its new student assignment policy, in which a ruling is due in April, 2012.
A few districts used TASAP to expand school choice. Champaign, Illinois is implementing a controlled choice plan that emphasizes proximity to a stronger degree, and emphasizes socioeconomic balance (using 5 different SES measures) instead of racial balance.
TASAP enabled them to refine their race-neutral index after using it for one assignment cycle.
Reducing School Choice
Other TASAP grantees were redesigning their student assignment policies in ways that reduced school choice, generally because the districts were losing enrollment (and, sometimes, Portland, like St. Paul, had been losing students, which under Oregon's school funding formula also meant that the district was losing funding. For several years prior to TASAP, Portland had been considering "redesign" of its high school system, including the possibility of closing one or more schools, and reducing disparities among the schools in terms of their enrollment, demographics, and academic offerings. Portland's high schools were, in theory, neighborhood schools, but the city permitted students to attend high schools other than their neighborhood school, and many students did this. Overall, choice meant that some schools, particularly in low-income but gentrifying neighborhoods, served fewer white and middle-class students than they otherwise would have, since those students went to other public high schools.
Funding followed students, and led to declines in the programs that the under-chosen schools could offer.
Although Portland's TASAP application had identified a goal of using the redesign process to "enhance diversity," and some participants wanted to bring the schools' percentages of low-income students closer together, the package of high-school changes that the Board of Education adopted in 2010 made relatively modest changes. It closed one campus that had housed three small high schools, converted the high school that served the city's historically 25 black neighborhoods into a middle-college magnet program, adjusted a few attendance boundaries, and reduced students' ability to attend schools outside their neighborhoods (Portland Board of Education, 2010a Education, , 2010b . In 2011-12, Portland high schools' percentages of students receiving free and reduced-price lunch range from 14.8% to 75.9% (www.pps.k12.or.us/schoolsc/profiles/enrollment).
After a planned partnership between the Boston Public Schools and three civil-rights organizations fell apart in 2010, Boston has been using its TASAP funding to continue its ongoing attempts to revise its existing system of choice within three zones, with spaces in all schools reserved for students who live further away than walking distance. These set-asides are a race-neutral replacement for the city's race-conscious controlled-choice system, and are intended to give students from all neighborhoods an equal chance at attending the sought-after schools in more affluent parts of the city. The Mayor and the Superintendent both want to shift to smaller zones, to reduce travel times and transit costs (Vaznis, 2011) . Many residents of middle-class neighborhoods want to increase their children's access to their neighborhoods' schools. Parents around the city found the choice process excessively complicated (Ebbert & Russell, 2011) . Thus far, the Boston Public Schools have made some changes to the process, but
have not yet been able to resolve a basic problem of arithmetic: although enrollments have fallen considerably since the 1970s, the city still has more students than it can accommodate in schools with strong reputations. Advocates for the neighborhoods where most of the city's black and Latino students live argue that school choice should not be reduced until all schools in the city are of uniform quality (McDermott, Frankenberg, Diem, & DeBray 2010) . Mayor Menino insists that all of the city's schools are good, and that the under-chosen schools simply have problems with how the public perceives them (Ebbert & Russell, 2011) . The latest round of public engagement on the issue began in March, 2012, supported by a no-cost extension of Boston's TASAP.
Rockford, Illinois's school board also retreated from school choice when it rejected the desegregative clusters that were the original policy direction outlined in the grant. After ending their consent order in 2001, Rockford proposed using TASAP funds to redesign its elementary school assignment process after one prior redesign had been unsuccessful in 2007. The district considered different scenarios that ranged from neighborhood schools to controlled choice as well as hybrids incorporating choice and neighborhood preference. After more than a year of assessing community preferences, the superintendent ultimately made no recommendation to the board, which was instead persuaded by a coalition of the business community, realtors, and young professionals to move to a zone system.
It was not until three months after the Rockford board's decision that the NAACP publicly questioned the new plan linking student assignment to educational quality and opportunity. They (unsuccessfully) argued that the choice plan that the district replaced with a zones plan was "'the only way parents of color, students of color in this community, have an opportunity, even a chance, to get a good education'" (Fay, 2011) . Further, in contrast with the business community and the majority on the school board, the Rockford NAACP explicitly saw school diversity as a means to improve achievement. According to their education chair, " [the] district's goals should be equal educational opportunity. That means valuing and respecting diversity. Looking at diversity as a means to academic achievement. …That is something that is not practiced in this community, it's not valued in this community, not acknowledged as an essential way to be educated… It benefits everyone, not just some people but everyone" (C.
Achebe, personal communication, 3/15/12). Rockford then, just a decade after the end of court desegregation case, represents an example in which political actors frame the influence of race and privilege in very different ways. The business community successfully influenced the board to view diversity, if anything, as a detriment to improving achievement and to adopt a colorblind assignment policy that-in a segregated community-will sustain the advantage of whites.
Cross-Cutting Themes
Because of the possibility for districts to spend their TASAP funds in a wide variety of ways, one of the major consistencies across the grantees is that their use of funds fits into a larger policy agenda. Some districts planned all along to fit TASAP funds into ongoing projects; others essentially redirected funds once the grants were made. Another theme across districts is more ironic: some used TASAP funds to help them close chapters in their desegregation history.
TASAP as Continuing an Ongoing Effort
In several of the TASAP districts, the federal funding had a low profile, with interviewees who did not work for the districts unaware that part of the work was federally funded. One reason for the low profile was that districts tended to fold TASAP funds into efforts that were already underway. Jefferson County was well along in the process of revising its student assignment policy so that it would conform to the Meredith decision. St. Paul was already in the midst of public outreach for "Large Scale Systems Change," including proposals to close schools and constrain school choice in order to reduce costs. Portland's High School
Redesign process began in 2009, and then the district's grants office recognized the TASAP RFP as an opportunity to fund part of the work. This might be a very "successful" way of using federal funds, in terms of producing visible results. However, these districts are not necessarily where need is greatest. As one former St. Paul Public Schools administrator said:
You could argue that it [TASAP in St. Paul] was the sort of straw that-either depending on your perspective, productively or destructively-broke the camel's back. Because there was this momentum, that it really was a good bet. If you're trying to draw some larger principles of federal grantmaking, if you were going to give Race to the Top Grants… do you do it on some kind of objective need and measure and the clarity of the plan, or do you do it based on some kind of sense of near-term likelihood of success? (K. Pekel, personal communication, 2/12/12).
TASAP as Support for Implementation
In a number of places, TASAP did not change policy so much as it went to fund policy implementation efforts. One of the reasons that these efforts received funding is the competitive funding priority that awarded five additional points for applicants "with existing school-boardapproved voluntary student assignment plans, seeking to obtain technical assistance to modify or implement those plans" (RFP, 2009, pg 37) . This funding priority, combined with the relatively small amount of money districts received in TASAP, perhaps favored districts that needed support implementing already determined student assignment policy.
San Francisco is a prime example of using the TASAP to focus on implementation. They had adopted a policy statement endorsing the broad parameters of their new plan in March 2009, prior to the existence of TASAP. The TASAP money was used for intensive community engagement to develop the specifics of the policy and try to think about improving access to choices for disadvantaged families, to build internal demographic capacity to be able to adjust the plan, to produce marketing and website to support the plan (e.g., online applications), and to monitor its effectiveness. Part of the plan also included feeder patterns from elementary to middle schools. This is new, and community groups were outraged because they had not realized this was part of the plan. Consequently, a second round of engagement is focusing on this issue. The district sees improving the middle schools as a major hurdle in the student assignment process. Given the fact that the district has already ended the use of one post-unitary 29 voluntary integration plan, it was perhaps especially important for them to focus on getting the details of their policy right.
Champaign is another example of a district that used TASAP money to address issues of implementation. The district had already switched from a race-conscious controlled choice plan to one that was race-neutral prior to applying for TASAP. They have used TASAP in two ways.
First, they used money to get technical expertise from choice consultant Michael Alves to consider other race-neutral factors to include in their controlled choice algorithm. Second, after a significant transition in district (and TASAP) leadership, the new administration has focused on trying to improve other details of implementation: publicizing the choice process timeline more widely, moving to online application submission, and helping to make the process more transparent and to share information about all schools. The latter detail in particular stems from the district's concern that opponents of the plan did not understand that it was not a pure open choice plan (perhaps understandable due to being called "Schools of Choice") and that families did not see all schools as good options.
Diversion
Another pattern in the TASAP districts is what we are labeling "diversion:" using TASAP funds for something different from what the proposal outlined. Boston, described above, was one of the diverters, in that its planned partnership with three civil-rights organizations fell apart and then the city received a no-cost extension to continue its ongoing efforts to scale back its school choice program. Thus, Boston also fits the "continuing efforts already under way" pattern. Orange County, Rockford, and San Diego also fit the diversion pattern. Orange County's TASAP proposal was to pay community engagement specialists to consult about the closing of 8 small schools whose operation was costing the district $6 million and $70,000 will be paid back to the US Department of Education. In San Diego, the original proposal to use the grants for magnet schools as a means to avert racially isolated schools were re-directed after a new school board was elected. As of this writing, the TASAP is being extended and redirected for general enrollment analysis. Rockford, Illinois's school board also enacted a policy, though it went counter to the aims of the desegregative clusters that were the aim of the grant.
Ending an Era
One final cross-cutting pattern is ironic, given what the RFP language hinted that the federal government was trying to achieve with the program: districts used their TASAP funds in ways that closed out particular phases in their desegregation histories. Orange County and Rockford, described above, did this the most explicitly. Evangeline Parish's TASAP work was part of its efforts to be declared fully unitary in 2012. St. Paul's shift from citywide choice to choice within six zones reversed the expansion of choice that had begun with its magnet schools for desegregation in the 1970s. If Boston's mayor gets his way and the city shifts to "neighborhood schools," it will end a choice policy that traces its origins back to the years when the city was under order to desegregate.
Discussion
Identifying and testing a policy's theory of change is necessary to evaluate whether or not it had the intended effects. In the case of TASAP, the federal government (and the Council of Great City Schools) made technical assistance available for districts to reconsider their studentassignment policies, on the assumption that the assistance would be an incentive for districts to maintain diversity-promoting policies after PICS. Similar to the effects of the mandates analyzed by Welner and Oakes (2005) , the top-down move by the federal government would stimulate action at the "bottom" of the system, in school districts. Based on our fieldwork thus far, TASAP's record is mixed. It did indeed support local efforts to revise and implement student-assignment policies, but only some of these efforts actually seem likely to enhance diversity. Districts' general sense that race-conscious policy remained illegal constrained the extent to which they pushed the boundaries of the Kennedy concurrence.
Milbrey McLaughlin wrote that there are few "slam bang" effects of policy (1990), and our initial findings about TASAP confirm this. If the intent behind the grant was to build capacity for developing student assignment plans, the theory has played out reasonably well in some districts. They did indeed hire consultants to help them with various elements of the process, such as data analysis and public outreach; some districts used this opportunity to enhance internal district capacity to help modify student assignment in the future. However, some of the plans that districts have adopted were not major changes, and other districts used the grants to help them move away from plans adopted as part of desegregation remedies. The extent to which they will actually enhance diversity in enrollments is unclear. In other districts, there was either an actual retreat from the goal of diversity, or a pro-forma compliance with 32 what was being mandated. We believe it is worth following events in these districts to determine whether seeds may have been sown for integrative policies in the future.
One reason for the TASAP grants' modest effect on diversity policy at the local level was that the federal government's position on the use of race-conscious tools to pursue diversity or reduce racial isolation was ambiguous throughout the initial grant period. In other words, the message coming from the "top" was unclear. PICS itself was ambiguous because of the multiple opinions and the confusion about what the Kennedy concurrence meant. The TASAP RFP stated its "absolute priority" as "applications from LEAs seeking to use technical assistance in preparing, adopting, or modifying, and implementing student assignment plans that use strategies to avoid racial isolation and resegregation in their schools, and to facilitate student diversity, that are permissible within the parameters of current law" (Federal Register, v. 74, no. 139, p. 36175), but the evaluation criteria for the applications did not. When districts asked USED for guidance in drafting their TASAP applications, federal officials referred back to the appropriations language and were flexible about what districts actually could do with the funds.
In our fieldwork, we were repeatedly told that districts did not even consider using race in redesigning their student assignment plans, including in districts that had had a history of doing so. When we asked why local officials believed this to be the case, they would cite the advice of national legal expertise, mostly from outside the framework of the TASAP grants. For example, Champaign officials cited the advice of national legal counsel as the reason for switching away from race-conscious to race-neutral controlled choice plan after their consent decree ended.
Evangeline Parish, which was still subject to federal oversight because it had not fully satisfied all Green factors, were influenced by an expert that had worked with another Louisiana parish to expand access to magnet programs to students of all races.
Another reason for the modest effect was that there was also not much pro-diversity mobilization from the "bottom up." Local politics generally pushed the districts away from pushing for racial diversity, and away from diversity in general. Racial politics has changed since the days of massive resistance and anti-busing riots; resistance to racial diversity now looks like skepticism that racial categories still matter, or arguments that other goals are more important. Budgets and enrollment politics usurped the energy of a separate agenda about use of race-based assignment (see McDermott, DeBray, and Frankenberg, in press; Frankenberg et al., 2012 ).
There also needs to be greater clarity of message from the federal level. One of the major findings from the implementation literature is that coherence of communication is vital for lower levels of government to understand what a policy demands (Rudelavige, 2011) . This sort of coherence was absent from TASAP. Implementation of a future technical assistance policy would be far more effective if it were part of a larger federal strategy to support diversity, in which officials within ED provided stronger and more consistent communication and were supported by the "bully pulpit" from the highest levels. Right now, there is no coherent strategy to support school-level diversity, although the December 2011 issuance of guidance to school districts by the Office of Civil Rights is a positive first step. 3 Should the federal government ever offer an additional round of technical assistance, this affirmative guidance would be useful in helping other districts think through whether using race might make a positive difference.
Although a more deliberative process, one in which a well-specified theory of change was developed with input from those inside and outside of government might have resulted in a clearer awards and implementation process, TASAP may have been the optimal policy design possible, considering the pressures facing the civil rights community at the time. TASAP did embody critical principles that may, in time, prove to have laid important precedent for the future of the federal role in equity-based and student assignment policies. We hope that further research will build on our findings about the local-level complexities of implementing technical assistance for student assignment. Racism is by no means dead in the United States, but the local politics of diversity are different in 2012 from what they were in the 1960s and 1970s.
White attitudes are more supportive of diversity, at least in principle. People of color have more political power, and they constitute the majority in many school districts. The way forward is not obvious, but so long as federal and local officials continue to work together, the door may not be closed. 
